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Abstract
File-sharing systems, like many online and traditional information sharing communities (e.g.
newsgroups, BBS, forums, interest clubs), are dynamical systems in nature. As peers get in and
out of the system, the information content made available by the prevailing membership varies
continually in amount as well as composition, which in turn affects all peers’ join/leave decisions.
As a result, the dynamics of membership and information content are strongly coupled, suggesting
interesting issues about growth, sustenance and stability.
In this paper, we propose to study such communities with a simple statistical model of an
information sharing club. Carrying their private payloads of information goods as potential supply
to the club, peers join or leave on the basis of whether the information they demand is currently
available. Information goods are chunked and typed, as in a file sharing system where peers
contribute different files, or a forum where messages are grouped by topics or threads. Peers’
demand and supply are then characterized by statistical distributions over the type domain.
This model reveals interesting critical behaviour with multiple equilibria. A sharp growth
threshold is derived: the club may grow towards a sustainable equilibrium only if the value of an
control parameter is above the threshold, or shrink to emptiness otherwise. The control parameter
is composite and comprises the peer population size, the level of their contributed supply, the
club’s efficiency in information search, the spread of supply and demand over the type domain, as
well as the goodness of match between them.
1
1 Introduction
The notion of a peer-to-peer system means different things to different people. To some, it is a way
to use the commodity personal computers to do the job of large and expensive servers [1], [2], [3].
Others build application layer multicast systems out of it [4], [5]. But there is one thing in common for
almost all peer-to-peer systems, that is the coming-together of such a system depends on the number
of peers (large or small) wanting to participate.
The formation of such cooperation without central management has its inherent advantages: it
saves the cost of central management; and more importantly, it automatically adapts to the need (for
example, in terms of time and scope) of the peers who collectively form the club. But what are the
forces that attract peers together? What would cause a peer-to-peer system to grow, sustain itself, or
fall apart? Are there some fundamental reasons that apply to different peer-to-peer systems?
The purpose of the peer-to-peer systems is invariably to share some resources or information.
Economists differentiate between two kinds of goods that are shared: rivalrous and non-rivalrous
goods. The former diminishes when shared. Compute power, storage and communication bandwidth
are examples of rivalrous goods. Many information goods, however, are inherently non-rivalrous. In
other words, they can be readily replicated many times with little or no cost.
Motivated by the above questions, we formulate a model for a club where members share non-
rivalrous information goods. Conventional resources such as computers and bandwidth are assumed
to be abundant. In such a setting, the strength of a club is determined by the amount as well as the
composition of the information content made available by the club’s prevailing membership, and how
that content fits the potential members demands. Based on this simple model, it is then possible
to derive some very basic conditions for a club to form and sustain. The model predicts a critical
population size, from which enough peers will find matching interest and form a club. Furthermore,
the model can be used to understand the dynamics of the content and membership, and whether and
how it leads to an equilibrium.
Since the model is simple, it is also general enough to be applied to many other information
sharing paradigms. Examples include web-based collaborative environments, newsgroups where
peers contribute their opinions about different topics, or other forums or communities for information
sharing.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to modeling the peers in terms
of their demand and contribution, which then leads to a model of a club in terms of its content.
Section 3 models peers’ decisions of joining or leaving a club, and consequently the conditions for
club formation, and other equilibrium properties of it. Section 4 illustrates the properties of the model
through numerical examples. Section 5 discusses the contribution of this model, the interpretation
of various results, as well as the limitations of our model. Finally, we conclude and discuss future
directions.
1.1 Related Works
Many other papers tried to model incentives in peer-to-peer systems and the resulting club dynamics.
[6] discusses private versus public goods, and argues that messages shared in web forums are private
goods, thus suggesting sharing is not simply an altruistic behavior. Several papers focus on how to
relieve the cost/congestion of some rivalrous resources, such as bandwidth and other resources that
a peer has to consume. For example [7] suggests a possible rationale for peers’ contributions is to
relieve the bandwidth stress when they share, their actions thereby benefit the peers themselves. [8],
[9], [10] use game theoretic approaches to model and understand the sharing incentives in peer-to-
peer networks. These works also discuss incentive-compatible solutions to peer-to-peer systems. In
comparison, our model brings out a new angle that is complementary and somewhat orthogonal to the
above works.
Our work is in part motivated by [11] in which a general model is used to explain the vitality of a
peer-to-peer network when different types of peers are involved. The type of a peer is characterized
by the peer’s generosity, which is used as a threshold to determine when a peer would contribute to
the club rather than free-ride. Their model does not explicitly capture different types of information
goods themselves, therefore the motivation for sharing remains rather abstract.
Our work attempts to explain the motivation of the peers by characterizing the different types
of peers based on their contribution and demand of different types of information goods. A peer’s
decision to join a club can then be related to the extent the club can satisfy the peer’s interest (demand).
This sheds more (at least different) insights to what brings peers together in the first place.
3
2 The Information Sharing Club (ISC) Model
The Information Sharing Club (ISC) model has three basic components. First, a population of N
peers, denoted by N , may freely join or leave the club any time at their own will. Each peer carries
a payload of information goods which are shared with other current members only when he joins the
club.
Second, information goods are chunked and typed, the same way that versions of different files
are served in a file sharing system, or messages of various topics are hosted in a forum. Information
chunks of the same type are not differentiated: an instance of information demand specifies the chunk
type only and is satisfied by any chunk of that type, as when request for a file is satisfied with any
copy of it, or when information query returns any piece of information of the specified class (e.g. as
implied by the query criteria, for instance).
Third, the club maintains a platform on which information chunks shared by members are
maintained and searched. A perfect membership system makes sure that only requests by current
members are processed. A request may comprise one or more instances of demand, and is successfully
served when all instances are satisfied. However, the search may not be perfect and is conducted with
efficiency ρ ∈ (0, 1], defined as the probability that any shared chunk is actually found in time by the
platform in response to a request.
We make probabilistic assumptions about both demand and supply: peer i’s demand instances
as well as the content of his private payload, in terms of chunk types, are drawn from statistical
distributions. Specifically, we assume peer i’s private payload comprises Ki ≥ 0 chunks drawn from
distribution gi(s), s ∈ S
△
= {1, 2, . . .} where S is the set of all types. The total payload of any group
of members (membership) G ⊂ N is then given by
gG(s)
△
=
∑
i∈G Ki gi(s)∑
i∈GKi
, G ⊂ N
Without loss of generality, we assume the aggregate supply function g(s) △= gN (s) to be
monotonically non-increasing. The type variable s may then be interpreted as a supply rank (s-rank).
In other words, s = 1 and s = |S| denote the most and least supplied chunk types respectively.
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Likewise, we define the aggregate demand function h(s) △= hN (s) where
hG(s)
△
=
∑
i∈GMi hi(s)∑
i∈GMi
, G ⊂ N
as peer i generates demand instances at a rate of Mi chunks per unit time, drawn from distribution
hi(s), s ∈ S
1
.
For current club membership C, the expected number of chunks of type s being shared would be
given by µC(s)
△
= n kC gC(s) where n
△
= |C| is the membership size and kC
△
=
∑
i∈C Ki/|C| is the
payload size averaged over the current club membership. Conditioning on the membership size, we
have
µn(s) = n k g(s)
where k △= ∑Ni=1Ki/N > 0 is the payload size averaged over all peers. We assume further that
members’ contents are drawn independently, which implies a Poisson distribution for the actual total
number of type s chunks being shared. Subsequently demand instances for chunk type s have an
average failure rate of e−µn(s) ρ = e−n k g(s) ρ. The average success rate of peer i’s demand being
satisfied in a club of size n is therefore
pi(n)
△
= Ehi(s)[1− e
−n k g(s) ρ] (1)
where E[·] is the expectation operator. This is compatible with the non-rivalrous assumption as it is
independent of the level of demand for this chunk type.
2.1 An example: music information sharing club
Tables 1 and 2 depict an example of six peers sharing music information of five different types. For
simplicity, we assume identical payload sizes (identical Ki’s) and demand rates (identical Mi’s) so
1Another possible ranking of the types is popularity rank (p-rank), which ranks the types according to the aggregate
demand instead. In cases when the p-rank is more natural to work with, such as when supply is being driven by demand
and p-ranks are more readily known, we may derive the requisite demand functions in s-rank as
hi(s)
△
=
∑
r
φ(r, s)
f(r)
fi(r)
where fi(r) is peer i’s demand distribution over the p-rank domain and φ(r, s) is the joint distribution of the two rank
measures that captures how well supply follows demand. (Perfect following would imply φ(r, s) = 0 ∀r 6= s.)
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that the aggregate distributions are simple unweighted averages of the peers’ distributions. Table 3
gives the resulting s-ranks and p-ranks of the five music types. The information may be news and
messages about the different music types when the club is a discussion forum in nature, or musical
audio files when it is a file sharing platform.
Table 1: Distributions of peers’ private payloads, gi(s)
Pop Classical Oldies World Alternative
Alfred 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Bob 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.05
Connie 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
David 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.05
Eric 0.5 0.05 0.2 0.15 0.1
Florence 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3
aggregate supply, g(s) 0.317 0.258 0.18 0.125 0.12
Table 2: Distributions of peers demand, hi(s)
Pop Classical Oldies World Alternative
Alfred 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1
Bob 0.05 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.05
Connie 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
David 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.15 0.05
Eric 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1
Florence 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2
aggregate demand, h(s) 0.108 0.367 0.217 0.192 0.117
Table 3: The supply and the popularity rank
1 2 3 4 5
Supply rank (s) Pop Classical Oldies World Alternative
Popularity rank (r) Classical Oldies World Alternative Pop
A peer’s success rate would depend on the types of goods he demands on one hand, viz. hi(s),
and the aggregate supply g(s) on the other. For instance, Alfred’s average success rate is given by:
pAlfred = 1− (0.1 (e
−6 (0.317)) + 0.4 (e−6 (0.258)) + . . .+ 0.1 (e−6 (0.12))) = 0.69
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3 Dynamic equilibrium of membership and content
Generally speaking, peers would join the club as members and share their private payloads as long as
their requests are sufficiently met. We make two simplifying assumptions here: (1) a peer would join
as long as a single current request is met, and leave otherwise; and (2) any request comprises d ≥ 1
instances of demand. The probability that peer i would join when membership is C is then PC,i △= pdC,i
where pC,i is the probability that an instance of peer i’s demand is satisfied when membership is C.
Conditioning on the membership size n, the expected joining probability of peer i is
Pi(n)
△
= Pi(n)
d (2)
Membership dynamics and content dynamics are closely coupled: as peers join and leave, they
alter the total shared content, inducing others to revise their join/leave decisions. The membership
size changes always unless the two-way flows between members and non-members are balanced.
Consequently, we may define a statistical equilibrium membership size neq as the solution of the
balance condition
(N − neq)P¯ (neq) = neq(1− P¯ (neq))
⇔ P¯ (neq) =
neq
N
(3)
where P¯ (n) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 Pi(n) is the joining probability averaged over all peers and all possible
memberships of size n. Note that equation (3) is in the form of a fixed point equation which is
indicative of the coupled dynamics of membership and content. Further, the stability condition for a
fixed point neq is simply
∂P¯ (n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
n=neq
<
1
N
(4)
Note that an empty membership is always a fixed point, and would always be stable for sufficiently
small N , in which case autonomous growth from an empty or small membership is very difficult if
not impossible.
Theorem 3.1 (Empty Membership Instability). Empty membership is unstable if and only if
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requests are simple, viz. d = 1, and
pi
△
= N k ρ
∑
s
h(s) g(s) ≥ 1 . (5)
Proof. Consider:
P¯ (n) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(n) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pi(n)
d d ≥ 1 .
Differentiating with respect to n:
N
d
∂P¯ (n)
∂n
=
N∑
i=1
pi(n)
d−1∂pi(n)
∂n
⇔
N
dkρ
∂P¯ (n)
∂n
=
N∑
i=1
pi(n)
d−1Ehi(s)[e
−nkρg(s)g(s)]
Since pi(0) = 0, it follows that ∂P¯ (n)/∂n
∣∣∣
n=0
= 0 for d > 1, in which case an empty membership
is always stable. When d = 1,
N
kρ
∂P¯ (n)
∂n
=
N∑
i=1
Eh(s) [g(s)] = N
∑
s
h(s)g(s)
⇔
∂P¯ (n)
∂n
= kρ
∑
s
h(s)g(s)
whence (5) follows from the stability condition (4) for the empty membership fixed point neq =
0. Q.E.D.
In our model, we regard empty membership instability as a necessary condition for autonomous
growth from an empty or small club membership. The above theorem implies that favourable
conditions are large k (contribution from members), large ρ (search efficiency) and a large value
of∑s h(s)g(s), an inner product of h(s) and g(s). Note that
∑
s
h(s)g(s) ≡ ‖h‖ ‖g‖ · 〈h(s), g(s)〉
where ‖h‖ and ‖g‖ are the 2-norms of h(s) and g(s) respectively, and 〈h(s), g(s)〉 is their normalized
inner product which measures their similarity, or goodness of match. Other favourable conditions are
therefore a good match between aggregate demand and supply, and skewness – or small spread – of
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their distributions over the chunk types.
3.1 Music information sharing club example with simple requests
Figure (1) shows P¯ (n) for the music information sharing club example for four kρ values for the
simple request case, viz. d = 1.
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Number of peers N
A(1.9, 0.315)
B(5.1, 0.845)
k ρ = 2.0
k ρ = 1.0
k ρ = 0.808
k ρ = 0.5
Figure 1: The music information sharing club example
For kρ = 2, the model predicts that an empty club is unstable. Any disturbance, e.g. voluntary
sharing or contribution, would trigger it to grow. The club would stagger rapidly towards the fixed
point n = 5.1 — where P¯ (x) = 5.1/6 = 0.85 and and sustain itself around there. The peers are
active members over 80% of the time on average. For kρ = 1, an empty club is again unstable
but the club sustains itself at a smaller average size of n = 1.9. With less supply and/or less
efficient search function, peers are active only around 30% of the time on average. For kρ = 0.5,
an empty club now becomes stable. Joining peers are always more than offset by leaving members
such that a positive membership is always transient. Peers are almost always inactive. Finally
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kρ = (N
∑
s h(s)g(s))
−1 = 0.808 is the critical case when an empty club is just stable/unstable.
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of club dynamics with direction field
It is important to note that the above analysis is of the average case. The actual dynamics
of a realization of the club membership over time as C(t) ⊂ N would sketch a sample path
(|C(t)|, PC(t)(n)) that staggers around the corresponding P¯ (n) curve2. However, the family of P¯ (n)
curves for all pi values define a direction field of average directions of the forces that act upon any
sample path. The average direction is towards growth above the n/N diagonal, and towards shrinkage
below, as shown in figure (2). In other words, the n/N diagonal is a boundary between two phases of
the club dynamics, a growth phase for the club states above it and a shrinkage phase for those below.
This is a powerful way to visualize the club dynamics, especially when pi may vary over time in more
complex cases.
2The staggering, or departure from the average case, would depend on the extent and rate of mixing, viz., the
stochasticity of the club membership. Generally speaking, a large number of active peers with strong flows both in
and out of the club would stay close to the average case with less staggering. Otherwise a sample path may actually get
stuck with a niche self-sufficient club that sees neither peers joining nor members leaving.
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3.2 Critical behaviour and multiple equilibria
Note that pi(0) = 0 and pi(n) is bounded and concave increasing in n. When d = 1, P¯ (n) is
bounded and concave increasing in n also. Subsequently, there is at most one stable positive fixed
point. Theorem 3.1 establishes a sharp threshold for pi, a composite control parameter of the club as
a dynamical system. The club would stabilize at an empty membership when pi < 1, or the unique
stable positive fixed point of equation (3) otherwise. In cases when pi varies across the threshold of
unity, the club would undergo critical change, and move towards either of the two stable fixed points.
When d > 1, an empty membership is always stable according to Theorem 3.1. For peer
population above some minimum level Ncrit > 0 such that n/Ncrit is first tangential to P¯ (n) as
in figure (3), at least two positive fixed points exist. The smaller one would be unstable while the
larger is always stable (see figure (3)). The smaller fixed point signifies a lower threshold, a “critical
mass” of membership needed for autonomous growth thereafter. The club would be in danger of
collapse whenever its membership falls below this level, even when such fall is transient to begin
with.
P¯
(n
)
o
r
n
/N
two fixed points
beside ncrit
∂P¯
∂n
> 1
N
∂P¯
∂n
< 1
N
ncrit
P¯ (n)
Ncrit N
1
0
unstable stable
Figure 3: Critical population and bifurcation of fixed points, for d > 1
Proposition 3.1 (Critical Population and Bifurcation). Ncrit is the smallest solution to the
simultaneous equations
∂P¯ (n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
ncrit
=
P¯ (ncrit)
ncrit
=
1
Ncrit
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where ncrit is a bifurcation point: once N increases above Ncrit, two fixed points appear on either
sides of ncrit and move away from it.
This proposition follows simply from the fact that P¯ (n) is smooth, increasing and upper bounded
at 1 (see figure (3)). The membership level ncrit is metastable as it is exactly marginal to the stability
condition (4). In the special case when the peers are not differentiated in that hi(s) = h(s), the
increase in P¯ (n) concentrates around an inflection point just before ncrit. However, when the hi(s)’s
are spread out so that ∑s h(s)g(s) is highly variable, P¯ (n) would increase more gradually. As a
result, the bifurcation may occur more sharply with a wider spread between the two resulting fixed
points.
4 A numerical example with truncated Zipfian aggregate demand
Consider a population of N peers with a truncated Zipfian aggregate supply, viz.:
g(s) = cs−β 1 ≤ s ≤ smax (6)
where c = (∑smaxs=1 s−β)−1. This rank-frequency distribution is widely observed in Web and
peer-to-peer file popularity measurement studies [12], [13] . The exponent β is often around and
below 1. Its skewness as measured by its norm is
‖g‖ = c
√√√√
smax∑
s=1
s−2β
which is determined by two key parameters, viz. the peakedness of the Zipfian distribution as
governed by the exponent β, and the variety of chunk types as governed by smax.
Generally speaking, g(s) may match the aggregate demand h(s) to different degrees. Below we
analyze two cases, viz. the perfect match case when h(s) = g(s) and the imperfect match case due to
a simple shift between h(s) and g(s). Also, we consider simple requests (d = 1) throughout.
4.1 Perfect match case: h(s) = g(s)
According to Theorem 3.1, the autonomous growth condition is
Ncrit ≥
1
kcrit ρcrit
1
c2
∑
s s
−2β
(7)
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Figure 4: Ncrit vs (β, smax) for perfect match case (k ρ = 1)
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Figure 5: Expected equilibrium membership and success rate vs N k ρ (smax = 1000)
since 〈g, h〉 = 1 and ‖g‖ = ‖h‖ = c
√∑
s s
−2β
. The dependence of Ncrit on β and smax is shown in
figure (4). Autonomous growth is favoured by large β (peakedness) and low smax (variety).
Once the control parameter of the club is above the growth threshold, it would sustain around
an equilibrium membership size neq as the unique stable fixed point of equation (3). Solving for
different values of Nkρ and β gives figure (5). This figure shows the proportion neq/N , which is also
the performance level of the club in terms of P¯ (neq), the average success rate of information search
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in the club.
4.2 Imperfect match due to simple shift
Supply and demand distributions would seldom match perfectly. In fact, one would often be
considered leading the other. For example, a demand lead case would demand a wider variety of
goods than the aggregate supply distribution offers, while a supply lead case sees more variety in the
supplied goods. The “excess” in demanded types (or supplied types) reflects the types of goods that
the supply (or the demand) cannot follow at a particular moment. Here we consider all such excess
being concentrated in either the lowest or the highest ranks for simple illustrations.
In the supply lead case, the supply g(s) is the same as defined in equation (6), and the demand
distribution is :
h(s) =


0 if s ≤ δ
c′(s− δ)−β if δ < s ≤ smax
for δ ≥ 0, and
h(s) =


c′′s−β if s ≤ smax + δ
0 if smax + δ < s ≤ smax
for δ < 0. c′ and c′′ are normalizing constants such that∑s h(s) = 1. See figure (6) for an illustrated
example. A positive shift δ > 0 means the excess types occupy the highest ranks, while a negative
shift means they occupy the lowest ranks. The supply lead case would simply have the expressions of
g(s) and h(s) exchanged.
Figure (7) shows that excess in the highest ranks are very demanding and would require a very
large increase in Ncrit for autonomous growth. However, excess in the lowest ranks actually decreases
Ncrit and autonomous growth becomes easier. This suggests that focussing of supply on chunk types
of the highest ranks would trigger autonomous growth more readily.
In summary, the distinction between supply lead and demand lead cases is immaterial to the
autonomous growth threshold, though it may be important to modelling supply and demand dynamics.
What matters is where they differ — in the higher or lower ranks.
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Figure 6: A supply lead case example (ssmax = 10000) with (a) positive δ and (b) negative δ
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Figure 7: Effect of mismatch due to simple shift (smax = 1000, kρ = 1, β = 0.6)
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5 Discussion
The simple ISC model displays interesting behaviour resulting from coupling of the membership
and content dynamics. As a dynamical system, it exhibits phase transition in a composite control
parameter pi. Information sharing is sustainable with a good membership only when pi is above a
threshold of 1. It implies no effort in increasing pi is worthwhile (e.g. by improving efficiency and
supply, or increasing peer population) unless pi goes above the threshold as a result.
Many researchers study the problem of excessive free-riding [11], [14], [15] that corresponds
to the existence of many peers with Ki = 0 in our model. Incentive mechanisms are devised
which reward contribution and/or penalize free-riding. One way to analyze such mechanisms is by
extending the ISC model so that the search efficiency a peer sees becomes an increasing function of
the contribution he decides on a rational basis. In this case, our ongoing study indicates that empty
membership may become stable always, even for d = 1, as long as the club relies solely on members
for content. An empty club and a rational (frugal) peer population are in a dead lock situation. The
dead lock may be broken only when either the club has sufficient initial content to attract the peers, or
some peers are generous enough to contribute without expecting extra benefit (therefore not rational
in the conventional sense).
However, free-riding is not a problem per se under the non-rivalrous assumption. As free-riders
are those with Ki = 0, we may redefine N to exclude them so that only contributing peers (those
with positive payloads) are counted. As a result, N is reduced, and the average payload size k is
increased (while the club’s average content Nk remains the same as before). All results in this paper
would continue to hold, albeit with the notion of a peer redefined. What matters is the contributing
peer population: the club would grow as long as they are joining to share enough content and attract
sufficiently many of themselves. The existence of free-riders is phantom to the system. They would
be no nuisance as long as provisioning of extra copies carries no sharing cost.
Incentives would help not by reducing free-riding but by increasing the contributing peer
population, viz. N . The distinction may seem frivolous as reduced free-riding is often regarded as
increased contribution. However this may not be true always. One may imagine a negative incentive
scheme which merely causes free-riders to demand less, or turn away altogether, without turning them
into contributing peers. The club’s content is not benefited. As incentive schemes are often costly to
maintain in practice, negative schemes as such should be saved for positive ones that aim to increase
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N directly. A reasonable principle in economizing the use of incentive schemes would be to focus on
those peers who are bordering on free-riding, to coerce them into contributing.
In fact, the club’s well being may actually be harmed in two possible ways when free-riding is
discouraged. First, free-riders may develop into contributors if only they stay long enough for the
club to become sufficiently important to them. Second, they may in fact be useful audience to the
members, e.g. in newsgroups, BBS and forums, where wider circulation of the shared information
often improves all due to network effects. (This would be diametrically opposite to the rivalrous
assumption, and could actually be more appropriate than the non-rivalrous assumption if it more than
offsets any sharing costs due to rivalrous consumption of other club resources.)
In cases where the non-rivalrous assumption is not appropriate due to significant sharing costs, e.g.
in processing, storage and/or network bandwidth, penalizing free-riding would be more necessary to
reduce their loading on the system and the contributing peers. A possible corresponding extension
of the ISC model is to incorporate the natural reduction in availability of information goods as their
demand increases. For instance, the failure rate of demand for chunk type s may become an increasing
function of its total demand nh(s) one way or the other. However, the choice of functional relation
between availability and demand should depend on the nature of the sharing cost.
Apart from extensions needed in rivalrous situations, the ISC model has two intrinsic limitations.
First, it captures only the average case behaviour of a nonlinear and stochastic dynamical system.
Transient and lock-in, especially when the club is small and peers act with large delay, may render
the average case view totally useless. Second, the join/leave decisions are often more heterogeneous
than assumed here. Requests may comprise variable numbers of demand instances and peers may
deliberate their decisions and behave differently.
6 Conclusion and further works
We have analyzed information sharing in a very general setting, by means of a statistical model
(ISC) with peers of different demand and supply of information. As a dynamical system, the model
exhibits interesting critical behaviour with multiple equilibria. A unique feature of the ISC model is
that information is chunked and typed, as we believe modelling the composition of the information
content is crucial in many situations of interest. Subsequently, it displays a sharp growth threshold
that depends on the goodness of match in the types of information being demanded and supplied by
the sharing members. While being rich in behaviour, this model is simple enough for detail analysis
17
of the equilibrium states. In particular, we analyzed a truncated Zipfian distribution of information
types and derived the growth threshold for the existence of any sustainable equilibrium, as well as the
corresponding membership size and performance level.
Much simplicity of the ISC model stems from the non-rivalrous assumption made. Real situations
are more complicated in that peers may be sharing both rivalrous resources and non-rivalrous
information at the same time. However, Benkler [16] points out that overcapacity is a growing trend
in distributed systems such as the Internet, so much so that even rivalrous resources are increasingly
being shared like non-rivalrous goods. On the other hand, free-riding would work in the opposite
direction if the community in question is prosperous and attracts so much free-riding that contention
for some shared rivalrous resources begins to happen. The challenge is then to identify the major
sources of social cost of sharing [17] and properly account for them. A natural extension of our work
would be to study the interplay between an information sharing community and different types of
host networks. Another extension is certainly the incentive issue: how incentive schemes should be
devised in response to different mixes of rivalrous and non-rivalrous resources.
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